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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES W. TAGGART, Trustee, a 
partnership, First Security Bank of Utah, 
a Utah Corporation, and Zions First Na-
tional Bank, a Utah Corporation, Mort-
gagees, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
10594 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Condemnation action to acquire real property 
owned by defendants in the vicinity of 2100 South 
and Redwood Road in Salt Lake County, Utah for 
use in the construction of a public highway facility 
known as "I-215", commonly referred to as the "Belt 
Route". 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The only issue in dispute was the amount of 
just compensation to be paid to defendants, which 
issue was tried to a jury. The trial commenced on 
January 11, 1966 and was concluded on January 22, 
1966. The issue of just compensation was submitted 
1 
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to the jury on special interrogatoires ( R. 53), the 
answers to which fixed the amounts awarded as 
(1) Total just compensation 
(2) Value of 78.11 acres condemned 
Difference 
$359,877.00 
318,301.00 
$ 41,576.00 
The difference between ( 1) and ( 2) above, i.e. 
the sum of $41,576.00, represented the damages to 
the remainder of defendant's lands not taken. Ac-
cordingly, judgment on the verdict was entered by 
the trial court on January 22, 1966 in favor of de-
fendants in the sum of $359,877.00 together with 
interest and costs (R. 98-99). Defendant partnership 
filed its Motions for additure and/or a new trial 
(R. 107-109) and after a full hearing thereon such 
Motions were denied ( R. 131). Thereupon defen-
dant partnership filed its Notice Of Appeal solely 
on issues of law (R.133). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On this appeal defendant seeks a reversal of the 
judgment of the trial court and asks for a new trial 
on the issue of just compensation. Plaintiff urges 
this court to affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent cannot agree with appellant's 
"Statement Of Facts" for two reasons, to-wit: 
( 1) Defendant states the facts in the 
light most favorable to defendant, who lost 
below, and in so doing violates the basic rule 
2 
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that the facts on appeal must be reviewed in 
the light most favorable to the verdict below; 
and 
(2) Defendant does not confine its state-
ment to facts, but repeatedly argues what the 
facts should be, and in so doing repeatedly 
emphasizes the opinions of defendant's ex-
perts and argues the comparative weight 
thereof while denouncing the opinions of 
plaintiff's experts. 
And so plaintiff believes it not only proper but es-
sential that a statement be made setting forth the 
facts of the case with the foregoing rules in mind. 
At the time of the commencement of this action 
defendant owned or was purchasing approximately 
926. 7 acres of land in Salt Lake County situated 
generally between 2100 South and 3100 South 
Streets and west of Redwood Road (Exh. D-1), be-
ing the area shaded in yellow, with the exception of 
the pole line corridor as hereinafter noted. Within 
defendant's overall boundary the three unshaded 
areas shown in white are not owned by defendant. 
The pole line corridor, being a strip of land approx-
imately 165 feet wide (Tr. 518), cuts through the 
westerly and southerly portion of the overall tract. 
The corridor is shown on Exhibit D-1 and the map 
attached to Appellant's Brief as two parallel lines 
and on the Exhibit P-11 overlay as an orange strip. 
It begins on the south side of 2100 South and runs 
due south until it makes a turn to the southeast, 
where it leaves the subject tract, and then follows 
3 
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parallel and adjacent thereto for approximately a 
quarter of a mile, then back onto the tract and con-
tinues westerly along the south side of Decker Lake, 
then onto Redwood Road. The corridor contains two 
separate power lines, one supported by large steel 
towers and the other by wooden poles and cross 
arms (Exh. P-27). It is owned in fee by Utah Pow-
er And Light Company. However, defendant has a 
reserved right to cross the corridor at any place 
where there are no structures (Tr. 518, 519). 
The south central part of the subject tract is 
occupied by Decker Lake (Exhs. P-11, P-24, D-5), 
embracing an area of approximately 180 acres when 
the water is one foot deep (Tr. 75). Decker Lake is 
surrounded by an earth fill embankment (Tr. 75) 
and serves as a collection basin for surface run-off 
and irrigation and tail water from canals to the 
south and west which naturally drain to the Lake 
(Tr. 73). In July, 1965 there were two basic in-
flows into Decker Lake, one coming from the south 
in two different sources and one coming from the 
west at about the center of the Lake in an open drain 
(Tr. 7 4). The outflow from Decker Lake is through 
an open drain runing from the east end of the Lake 
to Jordan River, with an elevation such that the 
water in the Lake remains at a depth of about one 
foot (Tr. 7 5). The outflow drainage canal was con-
structed by three irrigation companies on the strip 
of land owned by them in fee, pursuant to a Decree 
of the court under which such companies have the 
4 
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right to drain their waste water into the Lake and 
the duty to maintain the drainage canal from the 
Lake (Tr. 103, Exh. P-20). 
The topography of the land is relatively flat 
with some depressions, natural swales and elevated 
banks (Exhs. P-17, P-21, P-25). The water table 
varies and is near the surf ace in places, particularly 
in the swales and towards the north end (Tr. 108, 
109, 111, 114-119 incl.). Two large open drains 
enter the property from the west, one being approx-
imately 20 feet in width and six to eight feet deep 
(Tr. 483) and the other being approximately 15 feet 
in width and six feet deep (Tr. 483, 484), which 
drains cut across the property then join to the west 
of the pole line corridor and enter Decker Lake near 
the center thereof (Tr. 485, Exhs. D-1, P-11, P-18 
P-19). Another open drain approximately 10 to 12 
feet wide and four to five feet deep connected to the 
foregoing drain just west of Decker Lake extends 
to the north, running through the property and then 
changes to a northeasterly direction until it leaves 
the property at 2100 South (Tr. 486, 487, Exhs. 
D-1, P-11). 
The northerly portion of the property is tra-
versed by the Brighton Canal extension which enters 
from Redwood Road, continuing in a northwesterly 
direction, changing to a southwesterly direction and 
again changing to a northwesterly direction until it 
leaves the property (Tr. 101, 102, Exhs. D-1, P-11, 
P-18, P-19). 
5 
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The north boundary of the property fronted 
on the south side of 2100 South Street. There were 
no traveled ways directly from 2100 South Street 
onto the subject property along the entire 2400 feet 
of frontage. There existed (and presently exists) a 
gravel surface roadway known as Pole Line Road, 
sometimes referred to as 2700 West Street, which 
extended both north and south from 2100 South 
Street. The intersection of Pole Line Road and 2100 
South Street is located on the property adjoining 
and immediately to the west of the subject property 
( Exhs. P-2, P-11) . From that intersection Pole 
Line Road runs due south on the adjoining property, 
across the Brighton Canal by means of a timber 
bridge and then enters the subject property, con-
tinuing thereon almost due south to approximately 
the "Singleton" tract (Tr. 505, Exh. P-11). Pole 
Line Road has been in existence for at least 45 
years (Tr. 123, 124) and has a gravel surface 32 
feet in width (Tr. 597). In 1948 it was graveled by 
Salt Lake County for approximately one-half mile 
(Tr. 596) and its appearance hasn't changed ma-
terially since 1948 (Tr. 596). During at least the 
years 1947, 1948, 1953 through 1960 Pole Line Road 
was maintained by Salt Lake County, including 
snow removal (Tr. 598, 599). The bridge across the 
Brighton Canal extension has been repaired by Salt 
Lake County and the road has been marked with a 
Salt Lake County sign designating it as a "Dead 
6 
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End" street. Pole Line Road does not extend through 
the property to 3100 South Street (Tr. 600). 
At the southerly end of Pole Line Road an un-
improved roadway connects therewith which runs 
in an easterly direction and then divides, with one 
segment going southerly along the west side of Deck-
er Lake and ending at the open drain coming from 
the west into and at the center of the Lake. The 
other segment of the unimproved roadway continues 
around the north end of Decker Lake and down the 
east side, terminating near the open drainage canal 
owned and maintained by the three canal companies 
( Exh. P-11). 
On the east the property is bounded by the west 
side of Redwood Road and has some 2750 feet of 
frontage on Redwood Road along three segments. 
On the south the subject property is bounded by the 
north side of 3100 South Street and has some 2700 
feet of frontage thereon. There were no traveled 
ways directly from 3100 South Street onto the sub-
ject property along such frontage. However, 2700 
West Street (Pole Line Road) has been constructed 
from the north line of 3100 South Street on prop-
e1ty to the west which extends northerly to the south 
line of the subject property (Exhs. D-1, P-11). 
As of the commencement of this action the sub-
ject property was essentially undeveloped and un-
improved. The reason why it remains undeveloped 
and unimproved is of no moment here, whether it be 
for the reasons suggested by appellant on pages 4 
7 
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and 5 of its Brief or because of lack of demand, fi-
nancial ability or the like. Important is the fact that 
Mr. Haynie, one of the managing partners of de-
fendant partnership, at the time of the initial nego-
tiations for the acquisition of the subject property, 
had knowledge that the alignment of the Belt Route 
through defendant's property was one of the routes 
then being considered, except for the type of inter-
change with the 2100 South Expressway (Tr. 59-61, 
incl.). However, the saliant fact is that the subject 
property was undeveloped and unimproved at the 
time of the commencement of this action. 
This action was commenced on July 12, 1965 
and the date of taking was fixed as July 12, 1965 
(R. 53). The total area of defendant's property 
sought to be condemned is 78.11 acres, of which 
76.65 acres are taken in fee and 1.46 acres are taken 
for drainage easements ( R. 101-106 incl.) . The 
highway facilities to be constructed are a part of 
Interstate 215, commonly referred to as the "Belt 
Route" and is designated as a limited access facility 
(R. 3). Access to and from this highway facility in 
the vicinity of the subject property will be limited 
to the interchange with 2100 South Street. That 
portion of the subject property fronting on 2100 
South Street, being approximately 2400 feet in 
length, is being taken to accommodate the inter-
change with 2100 South Street (Exhs. D-1, P-2. 
P-11). Drainage facilities will be constructed ad-
jacent to the highway facility in both the southeast 
8 
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and southwest quadrants of the interchange and 
near the north line of 3100 South Street immedi-
ately east of the highway facility (Tr. 23-26 incl.). 
From the south end of the interchange to 3100 South 
Street the width of the property taken is approxi-
mately 260 feet (Tr. 8). 
The interchange between the Belt Route and 
2100 South Street will be a clover leaf design with 
the Belt Route overpassing 2100 South Street on an 
earth fill structure ( Exh. P-2). There will be no 
interchange at 3100 South Street but the Belt Route 
will overpass 3100 South Street on an earth fill 
structure. The earth fill structure for the overpass 
at 3100 South Street will be approximately 22 to 25 
feet high (Tr. 7), not 22 to 35 feet as stated on page 
9 of Appellant's Brief, and the fill will be approxi-
mately the same height at the interchange with 2100 
South Street (Tr. 18-19). From both the overpass 
at 3100 South Street and the interchange at 2100 
South Street the highway facility has a descending 
slope until the height of the fill averages approxi-
mately 8 feet between those two structures through 
the remainder of defendant's property (Tr. 17, 18). 
As to the intersection between 2100 South 
Street and Pole Line Road (2700 ·west) going south, 
the northerly section of Pole Line Road will be re-
located approximately 350 feet to the west and there 
an at-grade intersection will be established as shown 
on Exhibit P-2 (Tr. 21, 22, 23, 39, 40, 41 and 42). 
9 
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No plan exists to change the physical access existing 
on July 12, 1965 to and from 2100 South Street to 
defendant's property via Pole Line Road except for 
relocating the at-grade intersection 350 feet to the 
west. 
And so with that descripti'on of the physical 
features of the subject property and the location and 
nature of the highway facility to be constructed, the 
parties proceeded with the trial of the case. Defen-
dants first called as an adverse witness Jerry D. 
Fenn, a design engineer employed by the State Road 
Commission, who testified as to the nature and type 
of highway facility to be constructed adjacent to 
and through defendant's property (Tr. 1-43, incl.). 
Thereupon, and at the request of both parties, the 
jury viewed the subject property (Tr. 44-45). 
Thereafter defendant called as witnesses three 
valuation experts, Messrs. Loll, Solomon and Kiepe; 
and plaintiff called as witnesses two valuation ex-
perts, Messrs. Fletcher and Johns. All five valuation 
experts gave as their opinions the following break-
down as to the value of the 78.11 acres of land taken 
and the amount of severance or consequential dam-
ages, if any, to the remaining 848.59 acres not taken. 
However, appraiser Solomon, witness for the defen-
dant, actually gave two separate opinions which we 
number ( 1 ) and ( 2) , the latter being the one finally 
adopted by him and about which we will have more 
to say later. 
10 
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For the defendant-
Maxwell Loll 
Value of 78.11 acres taken 
Damage to remainder 
Total 
C. Francis Solomon ( 1) 
Value of 78.11 acres taken 
Damage to remainder 
Total 
C. Francis Solomon (2) 
Value of 78.11 acres taken 
Damage to remainder 
Total 
Werner Kiepe 
Value of 78.11 acres taken 
Damage to remainder 
For the plciintiff-
R. S. Fletcher 
Total 
Value of 78.11 acres taken 
Damage to remainder 
Total 
A. B. C. Johns 
$357,105.00 
315,415.00 
$672,520.00 
$302,931.00 
178,069.00 
$481,000.00 
$308,289.00 
251,711.00 
$560,000.00 
$366,050.00 
309,120.00 
$675,170.00 
$332,120.00 
-0-
$332, 120.00 
Value of 78.11 acres taken $236,076.00 
Damage to remainder $44,183.00 
Less special benefits 26,582.00 
Net damages 
Total 
17,601.00 
$253,677.00 
And so after nine days of trial and five and one-
half hours of deliberation the jury found the values 
as follows: 
Value of 78.11 acres taken 
Damages to remainder 
Total 
11 
$318,301.00 
41,576.00 
$359,877.00 
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·with that setting in mind, we now return to 
appellant's "Statement Of Facts" and note that 
ninety percent of what appears on the first thirty 
pages of Appellant's Brief is devoted not to a State-
ment Of Facts but to the claims, contentions and 
assertions of defendant as to its theory of the case, 
repeated emphasis of the opinions of defendant's 
expert witnesses, criticism of the opinions of plain-
tiff's expert witnesses and a lengthy argument of 
those opinions, the qualifications of the expert wit-
nesses and the credibility of their testimony and the 
weight which should be given to that testimony. 
Needless to say, those were all matters for the jury 
to weigh and consider in reaching its verdict, and 
are not open to argument by appellant to this court 
on appeal where the appeal is solely on issues of law. 
Likewise such matters might well be outside of the 
legitimate area of comment by respondent, but 
since they are presented in Appellant's Brief we feel 
obliged to make some response thereto. And so, re-
ferring to Appellant's Brief, we note: 
Pages 4 through 8 are devoted to an argument 
of what defendant contends to be the advantages of 
the property, confined to what defendant's experts 
had to say about it in their opinions and "informed" 
judgments while giving only lip service to the dis-
advantages of the property. 
Pages 10 through 15, inclusive, and the matters 
set forth in sub-paragraph (a) through ( i), inclu-
12 
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sive, are nothing more than an argument in support 
of the views and opinions expressed by defendant's 
witnesses and clearly are not in keeping with the 
time honored rule that the facts (to the extent such 
matters contain facts as distinguished from opin-
ions) must be stated in the light most favorable to 
the verdict below. Thus, whether it is more advan-
tageous to devolp the remaining property in several 
tracts as against one whole tract (a), or whether 
gone was this or gone was that or what Kiepe had 
to say about it (b), or the effect of providing no 
crossings through defendant's lands ( c), or what 
effect taking the 2100 South frontage or what Solo-
mon had to say about it ( d), or what Solomon and 
Kiepe had to say about the industrial lands remain-
ing west of the freeway ( i) , the commercial acreage 
east of the freeway, the residential land east of the 
freeway or the residential land west of the freeway 
(h), or the sewer and water (i) were all matters 
for the jury to weigh in reaching its decision as to 
whether and to what extent the remaining proper-
ties were depreciated in value by reason of the tak-
ing and the construction of the highway facility in 
this case. The jury has spoken on all of these matters 
through its verdict and that should end it. 
Likewise the selected excerpts from the Record 
outlined on pages 16 to 18, inclusive, as to the rea-
soning of appraiser Fletcher in support of his opin-
ion that there was no severange damage, whether 
consistent or inconsistent or whether he was evasive 
13 
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or unresponsive, went to the credibility of his testi-
mony, which was for the jury to weigh and not for 
appellant to argue in this appeal. And the same can 
be said for the comments on the testimony of ap-
praiser Johns in the selected excerpts outlined on 
pages 19 to 21, inclusive. 
Again the qualifications of the appraisers set 
forth on pages 23 to 26, inclusive, were matters for 
the jury to weigh in passing on the credibility and 
weight to be given to the testimony of those wit-
nesses. Significant is the fact that defendants made 
no objection as to qualifications when both of plain-
tiff's valuation witnesses were asked for their opin-
ions on values herein. However, since appellant has 
devoted only one short paragraph each to the quali-
fications of plaintiff's appraisers, we believe it ap-
propriate to make the following further statement 
thereof: 
R. S. Fletcher, M.A.!. - in the real estate bus-
iness since 194 7 and a fee appraiser since 1952. 
Since 1958 served as President of Fletcher-Lucas 
Investment Company, a real estate company which 
has existed since 1923. He has been a broker since 
1957 or 1958 and has engaged in the buying and 
selling of residential, commercial and industrial 
properties principally in Salt Lake County. He holds 
a degree from the University of Utah in business 
and a Master's Degree from Harvard in business 
administration. Mr. Fletcher completed courses 
given by the American Institute in 1949 and has 
14 
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since fulfilled the rest of the requirements for mem-
bership with the M.A.I. designation. He has apprais-
ed several thousand individual properties of all 
types and descriptions. Representatives of his clients 
are Federal, State, County, City, School Districts, 
major banks, saving and loan associations, mortgage 
loan companies, life insurance companies, oil com-
panies, local investors, attorneys and other real 
estate companies. His appraisals for governmental 
bodies and individuals are about equally divided 
(Tr. 603-608). Also Mr. Fletcher appraised the fair 
market value of the subject property in 1961 for an 
investor who was interested in purchasing the prop-
erty from the Falconaero Corporation, defendant's 
predecessor (Tr. 609-613). 
A. B. C. Johns, Jr., M.A.!. - engaged in the 
vocation of real estate appraiser since 1951. He 
graduated from the University of Houston in busi-
ness administration in 1949 and has taken post grad-
uate studies in real estate appraising, including the 
courses sponsored by the American Institute, at the 
University of Utah and University of Southern Cal-
ifornia. Having taken an instructor's course in 
teaching real estate appraisal, he has taught the sub-
ject at the University of Utah Extension Division, 
Brigham Young University and Weber College. Mr. 
Johns obtained his M.A.I. designation in 1962 
(either erroneously or facetiously designated M.I.A. 
on page 25 of Appellant's Brief), and has been a 
senior member of the Society of Real Estate Ap-
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praisers since 1958, having served as President of 
the local Chapter and a director and member of the 
International Board of Governors of that organiza-
tion. Since 1962 he has been a partner of Cook & 
Johns, a real estate company in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and although Mr. Johns does not personally 
have a broker's license the company does. He is a 
fee appraiser and has appraised properties for 
federal and state agencies, oil companies, the power 
company, a number of large nationally known banks 
and insurance companies and for individuals. His 
work is about balanced between individuals and gov-
ernmental bodies. He has appraised industrial, com-
mercial and residential properties and has apprais-
ed a number of properties along the south leg of the 
Belt Route (Tr. 759-764). 
As to the acreage values and comparable sales 
of witnesses outlined on pages 26 and 27 of Appel-
lant's Brief, the statement that the sales of compar-
able properties utilized by the witnesses for defend-
ant were probative and more relevant to the subject 
property is argumentative and the opinion of the 
appellant only and apparently one not shared by the 
jury in this case. In appellant's summary of the 
opinions of the witnesses on page 26 of Appellant's 
Brief the statement that Mr. Johns appraised the 
residential area at $177.00 per acre is simply not 
true. Mr. Johns put a value of $177.00 per acre on 
the land embraced within Decker Lake only, and as 
to the unzoned residential property outside of Deck-
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er Lake Mr. Johns put a value of $1, 725.00 per acre 
on it. Likewise, Mr. Fletcher put a value of $200.00 
per acre on the land embraced within Decker Lake 
and a value of $1,500.00 per acre on the unzoned 
residential land not occupied by Decker Lake. 
The summary of the sales contained on page 
27 of Appellant's Brief is highly selective. Needless 
to say, the jury had before it all of the sales offered 
in evidence, including those offered by plaintiff 
(Exh. P-11 overlay). 
We have no quarrel with the summary of the 
market value of opinions of the witnesses as sum-
marized on page 28 of Appellant's Brief, except that 
we should make mention of the C. Francis Solomon 
No. (1) appraisal (Tr. 307, 311, Exh. D-7), to-wit: 
Value of total tract before 
Value of remainder tract 
Difference or just compensation 
(rounded) 
$3,169,651.00 
2,689,000.00 
$ 481,00000 
As to page 29 of Appellant's Brief pertaining 
to the instructions of the court, we note that ap-
pellant made no request for an instruction that the 
verdict could be within the range of the total value 
testimony, if the preponderance was less than the 
value conclusions of the landowner but more than 
the government's testimony. 
As to the special interrogatories returned by 
the jury, we note that on page 30 of Appellant's 
Brief the answer to No. 4 should be $318,301.00 
and not $308,301.00. We make the further observa-
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tion that all of the claims, contentions and asser-
tions of defendant and the opinions of the experts, 
the credibility of their testimony and the weight 
thereof are summed up in capsule form and with 
finality in the jury's answers to the special inter-
rogatories. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT A NEW 
TRIAL 
Throughout appellant's "Statement Of Facts" 
and "Argument" it blindly assumes that as of July 
12, 1965 the entire 926. 7 acres was on the verge of 
being transformed overnight into a Utopian develop-
ment of residential, commercial and industrial com-
plexes fully integrated into a veritable "Garden of 
Eden" ( Exh. D-4) from the raw undeveloped acre-
age it was, severed by a 165 foot pole line corridor, 
cut by several deep open drains, traversed by a large 
irrigation canal and approximately one-fifth cover-
ed by a lake in the bottom of a natural waste water 
drainage and collection basin with a high water 
table (Exh. P-11). Defendant l'Ooks at the property 
through the rose colored glasses of a promoter-spec-
ulator, seeing only the advantages and ignoring 
the disadvantages, apparently hoping that the lat-
ter somehow would go away. Then comes the taking. 
Now defendant looks at the remaining property 
through different glasses and sees nearly complete 
ruination and what was once a "Garden of Eden" 
now becomes a "No Man's Land". 
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However, the jury viewed the premises and saw 
the property for what it was first hand and, having 
heard the evidence, looked through the eyes of the 
reasonable man and made up its own mind as to 
wherein the truth lies. 
Likewise, defendant places its valuation experts 
Solomon and Kiepe high on top of the pedestals of 
competency and credibility, who, as defendant ar-
gues on page 37 of Appellant's Brief, "stand head 
and shoulders above all other witnesses", particular-
ly plaintiff's witness Johns, who defendant states is 
completely mismatched in qualifications with Solo-
mon and Kiepe (Ibid p. 38). Defendant character-
izes Solomon and Kiepe as the "believable" witnesses 
(Ibid p. 32) with "informed" judgments (Ibid p. 
36) and repeatedly "weighs" their testimony against 
that of Fletcher and Johns (Ibid pp. 37-38). Our 
answer is that defendant apparently holds the com-
petency and credibility of Solomon and Kiepe in 
much higher esteem than did the jury. And we re-
iterate that such comparisons were within the ex-
clusive province of the jury and are not open for 
argument by defendant in this appeal. 
However, defendant argues that because of the 
above the plain conclusion in the minds of reasonable 
men makes the jury award so "pitifully inadequate" 
as to transcend and shock the ordinary senses of jus-
tice and common sense. And so we ask, what is so 
shocking about an award of $318,301.00 for the 
78.11 acres of land taken when it is over $10,000.00 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
more than the finally adopted value of $308,289.00 
placed thereon by defendant's own esteemed witness 
C. Francis Solomon? Likewise, we ask, what is so 
shocking about an award of $41,576.00 in severance 
damages when it is $41,576.00 more than what 
plaintiff's witness Fletcher placed on it and $23,-
975.00 more than what plaintiff's witness Johns 
placed on it? .. What is so "pitifully inadequate" about 
that? Is it shocking to the ordinary sense of justice 
or common sense just because the jury didn't swal-
low hook line and sinker the final opinion of Solo-
mon of over $250,000.00 in severance damages or 
the opinion of Kiepe of over $300,000.00 in sever-
ance damages to land which the State was not even 
taking? Are the severance damages somewhere be-
tween $250,000.00 and $300,000.00 as a matter of 
law just because Solomon and Kiepe said so? Of 
course not. And defendant should not even be heard 
to complain about it. 
Nowhere in Appellant's Brief does it contend 
that the amount of $318,301.00 awarded for the 
78.11 acres of land taken is inadequate. And it 
would be ludicrous to so do since the amount is over 
$10,000.00 more than the amount placed thereon by 
defendant's own witness Solomon. What defendant 
is complaining about is that the amount of $41,-
576.00 awarded for severance damages is inade-
quate. And so the gist of defendant's argument is 
that it is entitled to a new trial simply because the 
jury chose not to believe Solomon or Kiepe on the 
amount of severance damages only. 
To accept defendant's appraisal of the apprais-
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als of Solomon and Kiepe would cause one to wonder 
why the jury did not believe defendant's witnesses 
Solomon and Kiepe and accept their testimony at 
face value. We need only to go to the record and the 
stage set at the trial to learn why. 
First, Mr. Solomon took some twelve pages of 
transcript to state his qualifications (Tr. 243-254 
incl.). While we disagree with Mr. Solomon's opin-
ions, particularly on severance damages, we have no 
quarrel with his qualifications; but it is not for us 
to say whether he is more or less qualified than the 
other valuation witnesses. That was for the jury to 
evaluate. Such evaluation was not based solely upon 
his qualifications or his record. The jury's appraisal 
of the Solomon appraisal rested upon his perform-
ance in the witness chair and not on his laurels. And 
what of his performance? It is documented in 155 
pages of transcript (Tr. 243-397 incl.) and Exhibits 
D-7 and D-9. 
To begin with, on direct examination the wit-
ness Solomon was very thorough and precise. He 
methodically expressed his opinions as to the "be-
fore" value of the entire 926. 7 acres on a per acre 
value basis and the resulting total for each zoning 
land classification and the unzoned land (Tr. 298-
307 incl.), with the end result that in his opinion the 
total "before" value of the entire 926. 7 acres of 
land was $3,169,651.00 (Tr. 307; Exh. D-7). He 
then proceeded to state his opinions of the "after" 
value of each land classification of the remaining 
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lands, explaining which portions thereof in his opin-
ion had been "damaged" and why (Tr. 307-321 
incl.), with the end result that in his opinion the re-
maining 848.59 acres of land had a value of $2,689,-
000.00 after condemnation (Tr. 311; Exh. D-7). 
He then gave a breakdown of his opinion for 
the value of the land taken and the severance dam-
ages to the remaining land, which we call the Solo-
mon No. (1) appraisal, as follows (Tr. 321-322, 
352; Exh. D-7): 
Value of 49 plus or minus acres 
industrial taken 
Value 29 acres residential taken 
Value of land taken 
Severance damages 
Total 
$235,419.00 
67,519.00 
$302,931.00 
178,069.00 
$481,000.00 
And so it developed on cross examination that Mr. 
Solomon became confused when pressed for a break-
down on the amount he had assigned as damage to 
the remaining unzoned residential property (Tr. 
351-354 incl.), at which point he realized that he 
"goofed" on his appraisal. So a one-half hour recess 
was taken for him to compute it, but to no avail (Tr. 
355). On re-direct counsel for defendant attempted 
to rehabilitate Mr. Solomon (Tr. 369-372) and when 
unable to do so requested a recess at 11 :50 A.M. 
(Tr. 373). 
And so upon reconvening court at 2 :00 P.M. a 
most dramatic sequence of events followed. Mr. Sol-
01non admitted that he, Mr. Haynie, Mr. Moyle and 
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defendant's counsel had worked during the noon re-
cess from 12 :00 to 2 :00 o'clock P.M. with a calcu-
lator in the courtroom and re-worked Mr. Solomon's 
figures (Tr. 384- 385), with the end result that Mr. 
Solomon had changed his total figure for the value 
of the land taken and severance damage by approxi-
mately $80,000.00 upwards (Tr. 388), actually 
$'79,000.00. Yet he steadfastly maintained that he 
had not changed his opinion on the amount of dam-
age per acre over his previous testimony (Tr. 379, 
380, 385, 388). However, in his final analysis he 
came up with an opinion of a total of $560,000.00 
for the value of the land taken and severance dam-
ages (Tr. 379; Exh. D-9). 
What was even more penetrating was his very 
positive assertion that his opinions of the value of 
the condemned acreage in the industrial and resi-
dential areas, per acre (D-9), had in no way chang-
ed from his opinion recorded the day before (Tr. 
380; Exh. D-7). He then computed the value of the 
49.11 acres of industrial land taken at $239,605.00 
and the value of the 29 acres of residential land 
taken at $68,684.00 (Tr. 384). A comparison be-
tween his testimony recorded on Exhibit D-7 and 
Exhibit D-9 shows otherwise. Thus 
Value of 49.11 acres 
ind us trial taken 
Value of 29 acres 
residential taken 
Total 
23 
D-9 D-7 
$239,605.00 $235,419.00 
68,684.00 67,512.00 
$308,289.00 $302,931.00 
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Thus within the short span of one day the opinion 
of Mr. Solomon had increased the value of the 49.11 
acres of industrial land taken by $4,186.00 and had 
increased the value of the 29 acres of residential 
land taken by $1,172.00, or an increased from one 
day to the next of $5,358.00 in the land taken. 
It was indeed unfortunate for Mr. Solomon that 
such sequence of events occurred. The writer has the 
greatest respect for the ability and qualifications of 
Mr. Solomon. But that is of no moment here. Nor 
is defendant's evaluation of Mr. Solomon's compe-
tency or credibility of any probative value. That was 
solely within the province of the jury. But it does 
demonstrate the wisdom of the time-honored rule 
that the trier of the facts, be it judge or jury, who 
has the great advantage of a live-action, first row 
view of the appearance and demeanor of the witness 
during the course of his testimony, is by far the 
better judge of his credibility and the weight to be 
given to his testimony than does an appellate court 
on the basis of a cold, typewritten transcript of his 
testimony. Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15 
Utah (2d) 113, 388 Pac. (2d) 409 ( 1964). 
What then of the testimony of Mr. Kiepe? We 
have no real quarrel with the qualifications of Mr. 
Kiepe, but again it is not for us to say how he stacks 
up against the other witnesses. As with Mr. Solo-
mon, the jury's appraisal of the Kiepe appraisal rest-
ed upon his performance in the witness chair and 
not on his laurels. 
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The real argument we have with the testimony 
of Mr. Kiepe relates to his opinions on the nature 
and extent of severance damages. For example, in 
his view a total of 563 acres of the remaining land 
have "suffered damage" as a result of the condem-
nation, which would be equivalent to over 56 down 
town Salt Lake City blocks (Tr. 508). And in his 
judgment the whole of the remaining unzoned land 
comprising 436.69 acres would be damaged any-
where from $150.00 per acre to $1,150.00 per acre 
for a total damage of $106,943.00, including a dam-
age of $200.00 per acre for every acre in the bottom 
of Decker Lake (Tr. 515, 516; Exh. D-10). Like-
wise in his opinion the unzoned land as far as six to 
seven blocks away would be damaged by reason of 
the construction of the Belt Route through the de-
fendant's property (Tr. 517). 
vVhat is more, Mr. Kiepe then assigned a dam-
age of $56,000.00 to the C-2 commercial property 
which fronts on Redwood Road and is situated some 
three-fourths of a mile away from the proposed Belt 
Route (Tr. 4 72; Exh. D-1). The basis of that opin-
ion was because the C-2 property appeared to have 
a shopping "hinterland" which lay south and west 
of it (Tr. 472), including the lands outside of the 
subject property (Tr. 508) and after the Belt Route 
is completed the people from those areas (both with-
in and without the subject property) who would 
shop at the fictional shopping center would have a 
more circuitous route to get to the fictional shopping 
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center (Tr. 4 73) . For this the State should pay 
$56,000.00 in his opinion. Needless to say, the jury 
did not share his views. 
Without belaboring the point, a sampling of the 
many little side comments of Mr. Kiepe in giving his 
testimony is worthy of note. For example, he refer-
red to Pole Line Road (2700 West) as "a trail - I 
say a trail but let's say a road into his property" 
(Tr. 427). Apparently what he did not know is 
that the jury had already seen Pole Line Road dur-
ing its view of the premises. Throughout his testi-
mony Mr. Kiepe was determined that he was going 
to impress the jury with his thoroughness. Thus, 
when checking for his notes on the Rowland sale he 
quipped, "My notes are rather voluminous in this 
case" (Tr. 470). But he went a little too far and 
in so doing didn't level with the jury. 'Thus, when 
asked on cross examination how he verified the sale 
to Arnold Machinery Company, Mr. Kiepe stated 
that he had done a number of appraisals for the Ar-
nold family and when he called Mr. Arnold was 
not in. When Mr. Arnold, the president of the Com-
pany, called Mr. Kiepe's office his secretary took the 
message. The sales data on that sale which Mr. 
Kiepe testified to was given to him by his secretary 
in response to her telephone call with the president 
of Aronld Machinery Company (Tr. 501, 502). Mr. 
Kiepe was very positive about this. Yet later when 
Raymond L. Arnold, President of Arnold Machinery 
Company for the last twenty years, was called by 
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plaintiff as a witness he testified that although he 
knew Werner Kiepe he had never had a conversation 
with Mr. Kiepe with respect to the purchase or pur-
chase price of the property and that he had never 
had a conversation with Mr. Kiepe's secretary with 
respect to the property or the price paid for it (Tr. 
586). What effect that had in the minds of the 
jurors will never be known. However, it is obvious 
from the verdict that the jury did not accept Mr. 
Kiepe's opinion of nearly one-third of a million dol-
lars in severance damages to the remaining property 
not taken. 
Since we are still talking about appraisers, we 
note that appellant's statement on page 37 of its 
Brief that the witness John's appraisal of the resi-
dential lands was 800% to 1100% below any of the 
other witnesses', is simply not true. Nor is it true 
that Johns appraised the residential land at $177.00 
per acre. The fact is that Johns appraised the un-
zoned residential land outside of Decker Lake at 
$1,725.00 per acre, which is $225.00 per acre more 
than the witness Fletcher's valuation and $75.00 
per acre more than defendant's own witness Solo-
mon's valuation. Johns did appraise the value of 
only the lands occupied by Decker Lake at $177.00 
per acre. Likewise Fletcher appraised the lands oc-
cupied by Decker Lake at $200.00 per acre, but ap-
pellant takes no such offense to that. What is really 
so incredulous as to violate all rational thoughtis ap-
pellant's distortion of these facts on page 37 of its 
Brief. 
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All of the arguments made by appellant as to 
the inadequacy of the award were presented to the 
trial court in defendant's Motion For New Trial 
( R. 108) . After a full hearing thereon and after 
briefs were submitted to the trial court on the mat-
ters contained in Point II of Appellant's Brief by 
both parties (R. 110-130 incl.) the trial court de-
nied defendant's Motion For New Trial. In review-
ing the trial court's ruling denying defendant's Mo-
tion For New Trial on grounds of inadequacy of 
the damages, this court is limited to a determina-
tion of whether such a ruling was an abuse of dis-
cretion. Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah (2d) 1, 261 Pac. 
(2d) 670 (1953). The guiding principles in this 
area of the law are well set forth in Schneider v. 
Suhrmann, 8 Utah ( 2d) 35, 327 Pac. ( 2d) 822 
( 1958). Thus on pages 40 and 41 of the Utah Re-
ports it is stated: 
"Cases dealing with the review of dam-
ages, found by a jury, with 'invariable con-
sistency, recite the reluctance of courts to in-
terfere with such verdicts if there is any rea-
sonable basis in the evidence upon which they 
can be sustained .... " 
This court then went on to give the basis for the 
rule pointing up the advantages of the fact trier as 
being in immediate contact with the trial, the 
parties and the witnesses and the question of dam-
ages with respect to which reasonable minds are 
apt to differ greatly as being matters which a jury 
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is peculiarly adapted to determine. Then continuing 
on page 41 Ibid it is stated: 
". . . It is in order to preserve this right 
of trial by jury, and to afford litigants the 
advantages referred to above, that it has been 
the policy of courts to exercise forebearance 
in disturbing jury verdicts and to allow their 
deliberations to s w i n g like a pendulum 
through a wide arc without interference so 
long as they remain within the bounds of rea-
son. The refusal of the trial court to modify 
the verdict endows it with some further de-
gree of sanctity which increases our hesi-
tancy in disturbing it upon review ... " 
See also Stam,p v. Union Pacific Rail1·oad Company, 
5 Utah (2d) 397, 303 Pac. (2d) 279 (1956); Pow-
ers v. Taylor, 14 Utah (2d) 152, 379 Pac. (2d) 380 
(1963); and Jorgenson v. Gonzales, 14 Utah (2d) 
330, 383 Pac. (2d) 934 (1963). 
And in Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah (2d) 42, 
327 Pac. (2d) 826 ( 1958) this court re-affirmed its 
responsibility to be indulgent towards the verdict of 
the jury and not to disturb it so long as it is within 
the bounds of reason, in accordance with the prin-
ciples set forth in the companion case of Schneider 
v. Suhrmann, supra, and also that it is primarily 
the prerogative and duty of the trial court to pass 
upon the adequacy of the verdict and to order any 
necessary modifications thereof. 
The above principles are well summed up in 
the case of Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Incorpor-
ated, 15 Utah (2d) 113, 388 Pac. (2d) 409 (1964) 
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wherein on page 116 of the Utah Reports it is 
stated: 
"Due to their advantaged position in close 
proximity to the trial, the parties and the 
witnesses; and their practical knowledge of 
the affairs of life as a background against 
which to weigh the evidence, the assessment 
of damages is something peculiarly within 
the prerogative of the jury to determine, and 
the court is extremely reluctant to interfere 
with their judgment in that regard. From the 
plaintiff's point of view, her insistence that 
the award is inadequate to her needs and de-
sires is understandable. But we are obliged 
to look at the evidence and the reasonable in-
ferences to be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the verdict. In doing so, we 
do not see it as so entirely beyond reason as 
to require that we upset it. 
"Under our system it is contemplated 
that the right to trial by jury be assured. 
This is something more than a high-sounding 
phrase to be declaimed on patriotic occasions. 
It is the duty of courts to honor it in the ob-
servance. Whenever there is genuine dispute 
as to issues of fact upon which the parties' 
rights depend, they are entitled to have them 
submitted to and settled by a jury. When the 
parties have had a full and fair opportunity 
to present their cause, and the jury has ren-
dered its verdict, it should not be interfered 
with unless there appears some compelling 
reason why justice demands that it be 
done ... " 
Defendant's whole argument is centered around 
its claimed inadequacy of the damages to the re-
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mainder of the land not taken and as such comes 
squarely within the principles of law applicable to 
the jury assessment of damages outlined above. De-
fendant attacks the validity of the award on the 
basis of what the jury determined the "before" 
value of the entire 926. 7 acres to be, and says 
it was on this Interrogatory that all other Interro-
gatories depended. This, of course, does not follow. 
The special in terroga:tories couched in terms of the 
"before" and "after'' values were simply the means 
to the end, i.e. to determine the amount of just com-
pensation to which defendants are entitled. Nor can 
we go behind the answers to the special interroga-
tories and analyze or speculate as to the process by 
which the jury arrived at them. Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District v. Nelson, 11 Utah (2d) 253, 
358 Pac. (2d) 81 (1960). In that case this court 
affirmed an award based upon answers to special 
interrogatories where the jury chose the "before" 
value of the plaintiff's appraiser and the "after" 
value of defendant's appraiser. Under the rationale 
of that case the jury here could well have found the 
"before" value of defendant's witness Solomon and 
the "after" value of defendant's witness Loll, to-wit: 
Solomon "before" value 
Loll "after" value 
Difference 
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$ 325,581.00 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
And so an award of $325,581.00 based thereon 
would have been within the range of the evidence in 
this case. Thus for defendant to say that without 
the testimony of plaintiff's witness Johns the jury's 
answer to Interrogatory No. 1 would be contrary to 
law is nonsense. 
Nor do the cases of Weber Basin Water Con-
servancy District v. Moore, 2 Utah (2d) 254, 272 
Pac. (2d) 176 (1954) or Porcupine Reservoir Com-
pany v. Keller Corporation, 15 Utah (2d) 318, 392 
Pac. (2d) 620 (1964) so hold. Thus in the Moore 
case, supra, the award was based upon 233 acres of 
land whereas only 219.3 acres were taken; and since 
the award was based on an erroneous acreage it 
could not stand. And in the Porcupine case, supra, 
the trial court by granting an additure indicated 
that in its opinion the verdict was less than the low-
est amounts which the jury could reasonably award 
under the evidence. Noting this and after carefully 
studying the record, this court concluded that the 
jury verdicts were unusually small, suggesting pas-
sion or prejudice or a misunderstanding of the law 
or facts presented. 
\Vhile an award which is below the lowest valu-
ation evidence or above the highest valuation would 
require a close look at the evidence to determine 
whether there was passion, bias or prejudice or a 
misunderstanding of the law or facts presented, it 
is the latter and not the former, standing by itself, 
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which would warrant a trial court or this court on 
appeal to grant a new trial. 
This case is a classical example of the great 
divergence which can exist among the opinions of 
the experts where the real issue is the somewhat 
evasive element of severance damages. It is based 
entirely on the opinion of the experts and depend-
ing upon how they look at it they can vary as here 
from zero to $315,415.00. In determining the value 
of the lands taken the experts can at least use com-
parable sales as a guide line. But not so with sever-
ance damage. And so that is all the more reason 
why the jury is better adapted to decide it. 
Looking to the jury's award in this case of 
$359,877.00 we find that it is $27,757.00 above 
plaintiff's highest valuation witness Fletcher and 
$200,123.00 below defendant's lowest valuation wit-
ness Solomon. Needless to say it is clearly within the 
range of the evidence. Looking further at the break-
down of the total award the amount of $318,301.00 
for the value of the land taken is $10,012.00 above 
defendant's own witness Solomon's final valuation. 
Likewise the award of $41,576.00 in severance dam-
ages is $41,576.00 higher than plaintiff's lowest 
valuation witness on severance damages, Fletcher, 
who found none; $23,975.00 more than plaintiff's 
highest valuation witness on severance damages, 
Johns; and is $210,135.00 lower than defendant's 
lowest valuation witness on severance damages, 
Solomon. Again the award for severance damages 
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is clearly within the range of the evidence. That 
being so, how can it be said that the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to grant defendant 
a new trial? Accordingly, the trial court did not err, 
and its order denying defendant a new trial must 
be affirmed by this court. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN LIMIT-
ING CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE WIT-
NESS JOHNS ON HIS PRIOR APPRAISAL OF 
THE CONDAS PROPERTY 
At the outset it should be noted that the Point 
here raised by defendant was presented to the trial 
court in defendant's Motion For New Trial (para-
graph 3 (a), R. 108). After a full hearing thereon 
both parties submitted Briefs to the trial court in 
support of their respective positions (R. 110-130 
incl.). Thereupon the trial court denied defendant's 
Motion For New Trial (R. 131). 
It should also be noted that the question was 
asked late on the last day of trial at approximately 
5 :30 p.m., after the court advised the jury that we 
would finish the evidence that day and on that basis 
left to the jury as to whether they wanted to come 
back the next day, on Saturday, rather than the fol-
lowing Monday (Tr. 817-819). 
Throughout defendant's argument it assumes 
that suficient similarity existed between the Condas 
property and the subject property to warrant the 
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inquiry in this case into the prior appraisal of the 
witness Johns of the Condas property. The fact is 
that a foundation had not been laid for this inquiry. 
The only foundation laid was that the Condas prop-
erty was in the county, had "M-1" zoning, had ac-
cess to 2100 South and to Redwood Road (Tr. 828), 
probably abutted upon the Gedge tract and was in 
the same proximity of the subject "M-2'' property 
(Tr. 842-843) . However, no foundation was laid 
to show when the witness Johns appraised the Con-
das property, its size or shape, whether it was im-
proved or unimproved with buildings, roadways, 
hard surfaced and the like, whether it was level or 
undulating, filled or unfilled, drained or undrained, 
etc. or whether it fronted on 2100 South Street or 
on Redwood Road in whole or in part. In fact the 
Condas property cornered in the southwest intersec-
tion of Redwood Road at 2100 South Street, which 
in itself made it dissimilar to any of the subject 
property. 
What is even more revealing is the manner in 
which the question was asked (Tr. 843): 
"(BY MR. CAMPBELL) Q. You recall 
the - you testified the fair market value of 
$10,000 -
"MR. NOV AK: Objection, your Honor. 
"MR. CAMPBELL: I have the right, I 
think, to state my question - that you ap-
praised that Condas piece for the landowner 
for $10,000 an acre?" 
35 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant's counsel was determined to, and he did 
get before the jury the figure of $10,000.00 per 
acre. What is more, defendant argues here that the 
whole purpose of the inquiry was to test the credi-
bility of the witness Johns. However, the inquiry as 
made had the dual effect of also tending to establish 
the value of the subject property and if permitted to 
stand could well have had that result. Thus no in-
quiry was made to show that in the opinion of the 
witness Johns the value of the Condas property and 
any part of the subject property was comparable as 
a foundation to show prior inconsistent statements 
or opinions. Nor did defendant's counsel state to the 
court that such was his purpose so the jury could 
be instructed accordingly. 
Thereupon, after a conference with counsel at 
the bench, the trial court sustained the objection 
and instructed the jury to disregard the question 
and answer (Tr. 843-844). In the trial court's ex-
planation to the jury it was clear that the trial 
court had carefully considered defendant's right to 
cross examine but was of the judgment that its 
value was outweighed by the risks involved in intro-
ducing other issues which we did not have time to 
resolve in this case. The dual aspects of the inquiry 
made it a collateral matter, and to permit it would 
have required time consuming re-direct examina-
tion to explain all factors that went into Johns' 
prior appraisal of the Condas property, which in ef-
fect would be to re-try the Condas case and the fac-
tors there involved. 
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Defendant's suggestion on pages 40 and 41 of 
Appellant's Brief that the trial court understood 
the question to ask for the "price" paid the abut-
ting owner by the State is wholly distorted and un-
founded. The price of the adjoining property refer-
red to was the figure of $10,000.00 per acre in 
counsel's question which the jury heard. 
As noted on page 43 of Appellant's Brief, 
Nichols On Eminent Domain, Volume 5, page 27 4, 
Section 18.45(2) (supplement) states that on cross 
examination an expert may be questioned as to his 
appraisals of other property in the area which he 
has made, but only if a foundation has been laid for 
comparison of the different tracts appraised. And 
as noted above a proper foundation had not been 
laid here. 
The case of State v. Christensen, 13 Utah (2d) 
224, 371 Pac. (2d) 552 (1960) appears to be the 
closest Utah case to the case at hand. While the first 
two questions set forth on page 228 of the Utah 
Reports were directed to what the State paid the 
owner of adjoining land for proximity and sever-
ance damages and were sustained by the trial court, 
the questions were then asked as to whether the wit-
ness had appraised the adjoining property for the 
State. When asked, "What was your appraisal to 
the property on the west?" an objection thereto was 
again sustained. And then when asked if there was 
any severance damage to the property on the west 
an objection thereto was sustained. In passing on 
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the propriety of those questions and after noting 
that cross examination is admissible to test the good 
faith, knowledge, credibility and the like of a wit-
ness this court stated on page 229 of the Utah Re-
ports as follows: 
" ... The answers to the questions above 
quoted, especially the first one, would not 
have been admissible in evidence even under 
cross-examination; and although the witness 
did not know or was not allowed to give the 
answers, the questions were improper ... " 
We do not quarrel with defendant's notion of 
the above case that the first and last questions were 
clearly improper. However, neither can defendant 
quarrel with the holding of this court that it was 
improper to ask the witness what was his appraisal 
of the adjoining property. 
The same argument can be made that such in-
quiry goes only to test the credibility of the witness, 
as defendant argues here. But it is the dual aspect 
of the question which creates the problem and 
where, as here, the necessary foundation has not 
been laid to put it in the light of attacking the credi-
bility of the witness more harm than good can come 
of it and it becomes a collateral matter which is and 
should be within the discretion of the trial court to 
limit. Thus in Nihcols On Eminent Domain, Volume 
5, Section 18.45 ( 2), pages 277-278 it is stated: 
" ... The extent to which cross-examin-
ation will be permitted is largely in the dis-
cretion of the trial court, and the rulings 
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of the court upon this point are not subject 
to exception unless wholly arbitrary and un-
reasonable. The extent of the examination 
need not be extended to permit interrogation 
about collateral, immaterial or irrelevant 
matters." 
Here the trial court sustained the objection to 
the question after a conference at the bench with 
counsel and after carefully weighing defendant's 
right of cross examination, evidenced by his explan-
ation to the jury. And it should be noted that defen-
dant did not move for a mistrial or press its claim 
of prejudicial error until after the verdict was re-
turned. 
The trial court again carefully reconsidered the 
matter on defendant's Motion For New Trial and 
after a full hearing and considering the Briefs sub-
mitted by the respective parties was clearly of the 
opinion that defendant was not prejudiced thereby 
in denying defendant's Motion For New Trial. This 
puts us squarely within the holding of State v. 
Christensen, supra, where on page 229 it is stated: 
". . . The trial court by denying a motion 
for a new trial clearly indicated that he con-
sidered that the State was not prejudiced by 
these questions. As previously pointed out, 
the State did not move for a mistrial or press 
its claim of prejudicial error until after the 
verdict was returned. We overrule the trial 
court's decision on a motion for a new trial 
only if we find an abuse of its discretion ... " 
Citing Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah (2d) Utah 350, 
366 Pac. (2d) 701. 
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On page 43 of Appellant's Brief defendant cites 
the case of Bingaman v. City of Seattle, 139 Wash. 
68, 245 Pac. 411 (9126) as clear authority sup-
porting defendant's position, and in so doing states 
that the Washington court found prejudicial error 
in the refusal to permit cross examination in a con-
demnation suit on a prior inconsistent opinion given 
by the expert witness on the value of neighboring 
land. Defendant then quotes at length from that 
case. A careful reading of that case reveals that the 
quoted material was dictum. The Washington court 
reversed because of inadequacy of the award of 
$1.00 nominal damages and remanded, ordering 
that judgment be entered for plaintiff in the 
amount of $1,000.00, being the lowest estimate of 
the City's witness, or, if refused, a new trial. 
In Basch v. Iowa Power And Light Co., 95 
N.W. (2cl) 714 (Iowa 1959) cited on page 45 of 
Appellant's Brief, the three questions referred to 
related to ( 1) the prior statement of the opinion of 
the witness of a proper formula for determining 
the value of the powerline easement on the subject 
property; (2) whether payment to him for the same 
easement on his adjacent lands on the basis of the 
same formula was fair and ( 3) whether the same 
formula was used as the basis for his executing the 
easement. Needless to say, an entirely different sit-
uation there than here. 
Likewise the facts in People v. Murata, 326 
Pac. (2d) 947 (Cal. 1958) cited on page 46 of Ap-
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pellant's Brief are entirely different than here. 
There the witness had given his opinion of value 
of the same lands there being condemned in a prior 
flood damage suit. Thus all three cases cited and 
relied upon by defendant are simply not applicable 
to the situation here. 
Defendant argues that the alleged prejudice 
flows from the fact that the witness Johns' opinion 
of the "before" value was substantially less than the 
opinions of the other witnesses which changed the 
entire atmosphere of the trial and defendant was 
prevented from showing that Johns was grossly 
misinformed, or he was a fraud or an advocate or 
a combination of all three. Defendant's argument 
points up the intended dual purpose of the question, 
i.e. not necessarily to test credibility but to show 
that the "before" value of the subject property was 
more than what ,Johns appraised it at. Whether the 
question asked was all important is subject to great 
debate. And to say we don't know the answer when 
the answer obviously was couched in the question 
for the jury to hear is being somewhat naive. Like-
wise, the probability that the answer would have 
dealt a devastating blow to the credibility of Johns' 
opinion is moot considering the form of the ques-
tion. 
To say 'that this was the pivotal point of the 
trial is nonsense. This occurred within the last hour 
of the evidence. If there was such a point it occur-
red many days earlier when defendant's witness 
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Solomon dropped the ball and when defendant's wit-
ness Kiepe failed to level with the jury. 
We submit that it was within the discretion of 
the trial court to limit the inquiry. This the trial 
court wisely did, and after reconsideration conclud-
ed that defendant was not prejudiced thereby. De-
fendant's argument falls far short of showing any 
abuse of discretion, and that being so the judgment 
of the trial court denying defendant's Motion For 
New Trial must be affirmed. State v. Christensen, 
13 Utah (2d) 224, 371 Pac. (2d) 552 (1962). 
POINT III. 
THE ISSUE OF SPECIAL BENEFITS WAS 
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
The witness Johns stated that in his opinion a 
total of 46.23 acres of defendant's remaining lands 
surrounding the proposed interchange would be 
specially benefited by reason of the construction of 
the Belt Route and interchange facility (Tr. 814-
815). The only objections made by defendant went 
to general benefits, which were properly sustained, 
and no objection was made when the witness con-
fined his opinion to special benefits (Tr. 815). He 
gave as the reason for such special benefits the in-
terchange of the two major traffic arterials which 
gave the benefited property what he found gener-
ally to be considered by the market as desirable lo-
cation and that such relationship indicated to him 
an additional value of twenty-five percent (Tr. 
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816). He took into consideration studies which he 
made in other areas of land similarly situated with 
respect to interchange facilities which had been 
constructed (Tr. 816). He used two sales in form-
ulating his opinions on special benefits (Tr. 862) 
and took into consideration one sale of a property 
similarly situated which sold after that interchange 
had been completed (Tr. 866-867). 
In Mr. Johns' opinion the special benefits 
amounted to $575.00 per acre for the 46.32 acres 
specially benefited (Tr. 815; Exh. P-15-A) for a 
total of $26,582.00 in special benefits (Tr. 816). He 
subtracted that amount from his opinion of the 
gross damage of $44,183.00 for a net damage in his 
opinion of $17,601.00 (Tr. 815-816; Exh. 12). 
Even defendant's witness Solomon was of the 
opinion that the remaining property of defendant 
would have added visibility, at least in part by rea-
son of the interchange connecting the Belt Route 
with the 2100 South Expressway; that this added 
visibility would confer a special benefit on defen-
dant's remaining property (Tr. 366) ; and all of 
which he took into consideration in arriving at his 
opinion of the "after" value of the defendant's re-
maining property (Tr. 367). In view thereof de-
fendant should not be heard to complain about lack 
of special benefits. 
As to defendant's argument that it was pre-
vented in the cross examination of the witness Johns 
from inquiring into the nature of the special bene-
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fits, we submit that the questions asked were di-
rected to loss of traffic flow on Redwood Road (Tr. 
864). The trial court properly sustained the objec-
tion since the direct implication was a damage to 
defendant's remaining property resulting from tak-
ing traffic off Redwood Road and putting it on the 
freeway. Defendant concedes on page 51 of Appel-
lant's Brief that it has no right to the flow of traf-
fic. To say the question was directed solely to im-
peachment of the witness John's opinion on special 
benefits is simply to obscure that aspect and the 
harm which could result therefrom. In any event, 
defendant's argument is moot because the jury was 
specifically instructed that it could not consider the 
traffic flowing by defendant's remaining property 
on the new highway system after the taking as 
adding a special benefit (Instruction No. 21; R. 
44). 
Furthermore, the jury was instructed that the 
burden of establishing special benefits, if any, is 
the plaintiff's burden and the plaintiff must prove 
the same by a preponderance of the evidence (In-
struction No. 3; R. 53). Likewise the jury was 
carefully instructed on the nature and extent of 
special benefits (Instruction No. 15; R. 37). Thus 
the jury was instructed that if it found that the 
remaining property had been specially benefited by 
the construction of the freeway on the property con-
demned it could consider such special benefits as an 
offset against severance damage, if any. The fore-
44 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
going Instruction clearly defined special benefits, 
distinguished between special and general benefits, 
and that such special benefits, if any, could not be 
offset against the value of the land taken. The fore-
going Instruction was requested by defendant (R. 
60) and is in keeping with the principles of law 
pertaining to special benefits as set forth on page 
49 of Appellant's Brief. That being so, and under 
the evidence in this case, the issue of special benefits 
was properly submitted to the jury under the testi-
mony of both plaintiff's witness Johns and defen-
dant's witness Solomon. 
POINT IV. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
ON BURDEN OF PROOF AND PREPONDER-
ANCE OF EVIDENCE WERE PROPER 
At the outset it should be noted that defendant 
did not except to Instruction No. 30 (Supp. R. 2-4, 
incl.). Furthermore, defendant's challenge to In-
struction No. 30 on page 55 as being wholly erron-
eous because it implies that defendant had the bur-
den of proving special benefits or the lack thereof 
is not well taken. Instruction No. 30 (R. 53) spe-
cifically charges the jury that 
" ... The burden of establishing special 
benefits, if any, is the plaintiff's and the 
plaintiff must prove the same by a perpon-
derance of the evidence ... " 
On page 52 defendant acknowledges that the 
rule adopted in Utah and followed since early days 
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places the burden of proving the value of the land 
taken and the damages to the remainder on the 
landowner. However, defendant asserts that it is a 
harsh rule and should be changed prospectively be-
cause defendant is of the view that it imposes an 
unreasonable burden upon the citizen. That was the 
substance of the exception taken by the defendant 
to Instruction No. 18 (Supp. R. 2). Our answer 
is that it takes more than a mere assertion to 
change a rule of evidence so firmly imbedded as 
this rule is in Utah. However, defendant apparently 
only makes that assertion in passing since on page 
53 of Appellant's Brief defendant makes no claim 
of prejudicial error therefor. 
Defendant's main attack directed to Instruc-
tions Nos. 18 and 19 is that they unduly focus on 
the same subject matter. What defendant ignores is 
that Instruction No. 18 is directed to proving the 
contentions of the defendant and Instuction No. 19 
is directed to proving the facts in issue. Further-
more Instruction No. 19 is but a further explana-
tion of the meaning of burden of proof and prepon-
derance of evidence couched in different and more 
specific language. Thus those Instructions are not 
cumulative or repetitive as argued by defendant 
and taken together give a clear meaning of the 
terms defined. Donohue v. Rolando, 16 Utah (2d) 
294, 400 Pac. (2d) 12 (1965). 
Defendant then argues that the effect of the 
two Instructions is to direct a verdict against defen-
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darrt if defendant does not meet its full preponder-
ance. Those Instructions simply charge the jury 
with the true meaning of the burden of proof, i.e. 
first, if defendant did not prove its contentions by a 
preponderance of the evidence the jury shall reject 
such contentions; and, secondly, if defendant did not 
prove the facts which it alleges the jury shall find 
against defendant on such facts. If both charges are 
incorrect then the burden of proof is meaningless. 
Next defendant argues that the trial court 
did not instruct the jury that its verdict could be 
within the range of the testimony where the weight 
fairly preponderated. Yet defendant did not request 
such an Instruction, nor did i1t request any Instruc-
tion on either burden of proof or preponderance of 
the evidence at all. That being so, the defendant 
cannot be heard to complain on this appeal about 
the trial court's Instructions on either burden of 
proof or preponderance of the evidence. Hanks v. 
Christensen, 11 Utah (2d) 8, 354 Pac (2d) 564 
(1960). We submit that the Instructions thereon 
as given by the trial court were wholly proper and 
correct. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary issue in this case was the amount 
of damages, if any, to the remaining property of de-
fendant not taken. The trial by jury spanned the 
period from January 11, 1966 to January 22, 1966 
and the evidence, being primarily opinion in nature, 
was voluminous. No serious contention is made by 
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defendant that the award of $318,301.00 for the 
land taken is inadequate. The opinion evidence on 
severance damages ranged from zero to $315,415.00 
and the jury, being more liberal than plaintiff's 
valuation witnesses and more conservative than de-
fendant's valuation witnesses, resolved that issue 
by awarding $41,576.00 in severance damages, be-
ing well within the range of the evidence. 
The argument of defendant of inadequacy of 
the award would require the complete discard of the 
testimony of plaintiff's witnesses Fletcher and 
Johns. Yet no objection was made to either of their 
qualifications when asked for their opinions on 
value. It then resolves itself down to the matter of 
the weight to be given the opinions of the valuation 
witnesses. This was within the exclusive province 
of the jury and the jury did its job well. And the 
trial court having reviewed the same on defendant's 
Motion For New Trial gave further sanctity to the 
verdict in denying such motion. That being so, this 
court should not change it absent a clear showing 
of an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
court. Appellant's Brief falls far short of that, as 
does the record before this court. 
Likewise the trial court wisely and within its 
discretion limited the cross-examination of the wit-
ness Johns as to his prior appraisal of the Condas 
property. In so doing it carefully weighed defen-
dant's right of cross-examination against the harm 
which could result from the dual aspect of the in-
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quiry by introducing collateral matters which could 
not be resolved in this case save and except to re-try 
the Condas case and the factors there involved. De-
fendant did not move for a mistrial or press its 
claim of prejudicial error until after the verdict 
was returned. The trial court carefully reviewed its 
ruling after a full hearing, submission of briefs and 
in denying defendant's Motion For New Trial con-
cluded that defendant was not prejudiced thereby. 
Neither Appellant's Brief nor the record before this 
court show that the trial court abused its discretion 
or that defendant was in any manner prejudiced 
thereby. 
The issue of special benefits was properly sub-
mitted to the jury in the court's Instructions under 
the testimony of both plaintiff's witness Johns and 
defendant's witness Solomon. Instructions Nos. 18, 
19 and 30 relating to burden of proof and prepon-
derance of the evidence were correct and proper. 
Defendant requested no Instruction on either bur-
den of proof or preponderance of the evidence, nor 
did defendant except to Instruction No. 30. That 
being so, defendant cannot be heard to complain 
about those Instructions on this appeal. 
We submit that defendant was well represent-
ed at the trial of this case by able counsel as the 
record shows throughout, and likewise defendant 
received a full and fair trial. And the jury, having 
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fixed the award of just compensation, which was 
well within the range of the evidence, and the award 
having received the approval of the trial court, it 
must stand. Accordingly, we respectfully submit 
that the judgment of the lower court must in all 
respects be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH NOV AK 
Special Assistant 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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